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Reforming College Sports and a
Constrained, Conditional Antitrust
Exemption
Andrew Zimbalist*
Smith College, United States

This paper argues that intercollegiate athletics is at a turning point. The status quo is not
stable and change is coming. This change can move college sports further toward
commercialization and quasi-professionalism or it can endeavor to reinforce the historical
vision of college sports as an amateur activity subordinated to the educational mission of
U.S. colleges. The former path will lead to increasing academic scandals, widespread
ﬁnancial insolvency and diminishing support for Olympic sports and Title IX. The latter
path, while not without its own challenges, may succeed in restoring a proper balance
between athletics and academics. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Intercollegiate athletics has long been caught in the
nether world between professional and amateur
sport. As a hybrid and immensely popular system
run by the NCAA, intercollegiate athletics has been
critiqued as ethically hypocritical, educationally
corrosive, materially exploitative and economically
unsustainable. Political and legal pressure has been
building over the last ten years to reform the system. Such reform will ultimately require a choice
between the professional and amateur models, or a
bifurcation wherein a select group of a few dozen
schools chooses a professional paradigm while a
thousand-plus schools opt for the ofﬁcial NCAA vision of academically centered, amateur athletics. After considering the arguments for a market-oriented
reform toward professionalism, this article will argue
for an educationally based reform accompanied by a
constrained and conditional antitrust exemption for
the NCAA or an alternative governing body.
*Correspondence to: Andrew Zimbalist, Smith College, United
States. E-mail: azimbali@smith.edu
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INEQUALITY AND FINANCIAL STRAIN
To understand the dimensions of the paradigmatic
choice confronting college sports, it is necessary ﬁrst
to consider the economic pressures it faces. At least
since the National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in 1984, as intercollegiate athletics has become more and more commercialized and
the ﬁnancial stakes have sharpened for participating
schools, there has been a clear trend toward greater
revenue inequality. This inequality is making it increasingly expensive and untenable for the vast majority of schools, even those in Division I, to pursue
athletic glory.
With the NCAA’s longstanding national TV policy
struck down in 1984, schools and conferences were
left to fend for themselves. The NCAA television cartel was broken. The leading football colleges and conferences were cut free, and the weaker football
colleges lost the protection of the previous NCAA
plan.
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Table 1. Revenue Inequality among the Approximately Top 150 Athletic Programs, 1962–1997
Year

Top school/average school

1962
1970
1980
1989
1995
1997

1.81
1.92
2.48
3.04
3.29
3.48

Sources: Mitchell Raiborn, Financial Analysis of Intercollegiate
Athletics. Kansas City: NCAA, 1970; M. Raiborn, Revenues and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 1970–1977, 1978–
1981, 1981–1985, 1985–1989. Overland Park: NCAA, 1978,
1982, 1986, 1990; Daniel Fulks, Revenues and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 1993. Overland Park: NCAA, 1994; D.
Fulks, Revenues and Expenses of Division I and II Intercollegiate
Athletic Programs, 1995, 1997. Overland Park: NCAA, 1996, 1998.

The data in Table 1 illustrate the revenue distributional impact of the 1984 Supreme Court decision and
the conference restructuring of the 1990s. During the
18 years between 1962 and 1980, there was a steady increase in relative revenue inequality across the top 150
college athletic programs, with the ratio of the top revenue program to the average (mean) revenue program increasing by 0.67 points. During the next 17-year period,
1980–1997, the ratio increased at a 50% faster rate or by
1.00 points.
It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court ruling
was largely coincident with the explosion in popularity
of cable television in the United States. Whereas in
1980 there were 15.5 million cable TV homes (or
19.9% of TV households), and by 1990 there were 52
million cable TV homes (or 56.4% of TV households).
As is well known, cable television added a second
revenue stream (monthly subscription fees) to the traditional advertising stream, and, hence, its expansion
helps to explain the rapid growth in television contracts
for the elite football conferences in Division I.
Other factors promoting inequality include: the Bowl
Championship Series (BCS), the Football Championship Playoff (FCP), skewed revenue distributions from
the NCAA, the emergence of conference-owned regional sports channels and the explosion of network
conference television contracts. Since its inception in
1998 through 2014, the BCS allowed for preferential
bowl access and sharply differential revenues to ﬂow
to the six original BCS (aka, automatic qualiﬁer or
AQ) conferences. The FCP extends the unequal distribution of revenues ﬂows, but it roughly triples the
amount of money distributed.
Revenue distribution data prior to 2000 is scarce and
that which is available is generally tabulated with
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

different metrics than what has been available since
2000. It is therefore difﬁcult to get an accurate picture
of how much inequality has increased over the decades.
Further, because of inconsistent and incomplete accounting practices within athletic departments and the
fact that a good deal of revenue and cost information
is treated as proprietary, it is impossible even today to
achieve a full and accurate picture of the extent of inequality. Nonetheless, it is possible to compile pieces
of information from the periodic NCAA Revenues and
Expenses reports1, the EADA reports and other sources
to assemble a broad outline of the trends and the status
quo in revenue inequality among FBS programs.
In Table 1 above, we presented data on the highest to
average revenue ratio for roughly the top 150 athletic
programs between 1962 and 1997. It depicted a clear
trend toward greater inequality with some acceleration
in the trend after the 1984 Supreme Court decision.
The post-2003 data is for the FBS (128 schools in
2014–2015), and it refers to the highest to the median
revenue ratio. With the skewed revenue distribution that
prevails in the FBS, the mean will typically be considerably above the median, so these two data series are not
comparable.
Although the top/average revenue ratio series ends in
1997, it is possible to extend the trend through 2003 by
reference to NCAA data for football and men’s basketball programs. Table 2 shows that the ratio of the highest
revenue program from football and men’s basketball to
the average revenue program steadily increased from
3.56 in fy1997, to 3.66 in fy1999 and to 3.89 in fy2003.
After 2003, the average (mean) program is no longer reported; only the median is reported. As shown in
Table 3, the ratio of the highest to median in both football and basketball continues its steady ascent between
fy2004 and fy2014.2
Finally, consider the numbers for entire athletic programs during 2004–2014 in Table 4. They indicate that
while relative inequality has stabilized (as deﬁned by the
top to median athletic program), the absolute amount of
inequality (the dollar difference between the top and
median program) has continued to grow rapidly.

Table 2. FBS Football and Men’s Basketball Revenue, 1997–2003
High

Average

Ratio
(high/avg)

1997
1999
2003

$37 400 000
$44 700 000
$67 300 000

$10 500 000
$12 200 000
$17 300 000

3.56
3.66
3.89
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Table 3. FBS Football and Men’s Basketball Revenue, 2004–2014 (millions of dollars)

Fy

Median
generated
revenue

Football
8.3
2004
2010
16.2
2014
21.7
Men’s Basketball
2004
3.2
2010
4.8
2014
5.8

Top
generated
revenue

Top /
median

Top median

46.2

5.6

37.9

93.9
151

5.8
7.0

77.7
129.3

16.5
25.9
40.6

5.2
5.4
7.0

13.3
21.1
34.8

This pattern of inequality is underscored by
considering the decile breakdown of revenues in football and men’s basketball within the 124 FBS schools
in fy 2014. In football, 40% of the programs had revenues below $7.56 million in fy 2014, while in basketball
40% had revenues below $3.2 million. Meanwhile, even
the bottom half of FBS schools are trying to remain
competitive and expanding their athletic spending. The
average athletic spending per student athlete in FBS
went from $63 000 in 2004, to $85 000 in 2008, to
$105 000 in 2012 and to $116 000 in 2014.
Accordingly, the median FBS athletic programs run
a substantial and growing operating deﬁcit. As depicted
in Table 4, these operating deﬁcits (median net revenues) have grown steadily from $5.9 million in 2004
to $14.7 million in 2014. In 2013–2014, only 24 athletic
programs showed an operating surplus, and this was before counting the bulk of capital costs (which an NCAA
study separately estimated to average over $20 million
per year per FBS school) as well as certain indirect
costs.3
The current ﬁnancial situation for the NCAA, then, is
particularly tenuous. On the one hand, as a few dozen
schools rake in tens of millions of dollars of additional
revenue,4 the remaining schools in FBS and throughout
Divisions I, II and III, are experiencing increasing subsidies to athletics during a period of budgetary stringency.
On the other hand, star athletes at the leading programs
witness the new copious inﬂows of revenue and feel
cheated by their below-market compensation and the

Table 4.

absence of a true college education. This perceived exploitation, in turn, has led to a variety of actions and
litigations.

CALLS FOR REFORM AND INITIAL
EFFORTS
Largely in response to the Keller, O’Bannon and
Jenkins legal suits as well as the now aborted attempt
by the football players at Northwestern to unionize,
the NCAA has reorganized itself to allow for modest reform to beneﬁt athletes materially. These reforms include: in 2014, the NCAA allowed for expanded food
service for athletes and for multi-year scholarships
(banned since 1974) to return, and, in 2015, it
reintroduced cost of attendance stipends in Division I,
and basically allowed the Power Five conferences
within FBS of Division I to chart their own ﬁnancial
course. These reforms will only exacerbate the trend toward growing inequality and school subsidies to
athletics.
When capital expenses and indirect costs are included in the accounting analysis, the number of college
athletic programs running a true surplus in any given
year dips to under ten. Many economists argue that most
FBS schools have proﬁtable athletic programs, but they
do not show a surplus because there is no market discipline to contain costs. The second part of the contention
is accurate. College athletic programs do not have stockholders who demand to see a proﬁt at the end of every
quarter in order to boost the price of the stock; rather,
they have stakeholders (boosters, alumni, students,
sponsors, media companies) who demand to see victories. The consequence is that the cost side is paid little
attention and programs’ athletic directors spend freely
on facilities, coaches, recruitment, tutors and travel to
build winning teams. Absent a competitive labor market
for the athletes, the money that would otherwise go to
athletes goes instead into other aspects of the program.
The typical pattern is that ADs’ objective is to maximize
wins and the vast majority of programs run in deﬁcit.

Athletic Programs, 2004–2014 (Millions of Dollars)

Fy

Median generated revenue

Top generated revenue

Top / median

Top - median

Median net revenues

2004
2010
2012
2014

22.9
35.3
40.6
44.5

103.9
143.6
163.3
193.9

4.5
4.1
4.0
4.4

81
108.3
122.7
149.4

-5.9
-9.4
-12.3
-14.7

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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A word of clariﬁcation is in order here. It is common for more than half of FBS football teams (55%
in 2013–2014) and roughly half of FBS men’s basketball teams (50% in 2013–2014) to run an operating
surplus.5 That is, a surplus before capital and certain
indirect costs are included. But typical FBS athletic
programs support 15 to 30 sports, virtually all of
which run a substantial operating deﬁcit. When all
the sports are considered together (i.e. when the entire
athletics department budget is considered), on an operating basis in a typical year there are roughly 20 FBS
programs showing a surplus and roughly one hundred
showing a deﬁcit.
The massive amounts of new television money that
have poured into the ACC, SEC, Big 12, Big 10 and
PAC-12 (Power Five) conferences provide the necessary
resources for roughly half of their 66 universities to cover
the added expenses from the 2014 and 2015 reforms. The
remaining 60-odd schools will have either to accept
growing deﬁcits or they will have to opt out of the arms
race of top-level intercollegiate athletics. Those schools
facing larger athletic deﬁcits, in turn, will have the options to (i) raise student activity fees, (ii) cut back ﬁnancial aid6 or substitute loan aid for grant aid, raising
further student debt, or (iii) otherwise reduce the academic budget.
Thus, the current state of ﬁnances and operations
of intercollegiate athletics is in ﬂux, in the red and
not sustainable. Change will come. The only question is whether college administrations, the NCAA
(or another governing body) or the U.S. Congress
will take part in deliberately shaping this change
or they will allow the laissez-faire process that has
been unfolding to continue.
The recent Northwestern University case, wherein
the Chicago district of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) ﬁrst opined that scholarship football
players are employees and could unionize, and then
the national NLRB asserting that it did not have jurisdiction, left the players without the possibility of
unionizing. But in its decision the national NLRB
made a call to the U.S. Congress to clarify the institutional structure of college sports. In particular, the
NLRB made three key observations: (i) intercollegiate
athletics was in a transitional phase in 2015, (ii)
allowing unionization would have engendered systemic instability by permitting the 17 private colleges
out of 128 FBS schools in fy 2015 to unionize, and
(iii) there was a need to resolve the labor market issues
and academic tensions in the current system.
The NCAA has been responding, with various degrees of alacrity and seriousness, to the call for reform
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

ever since its founding in December 1905. Whatever
reforms it has promulgated have failed to reverse the
tides of academic hypocrisy, commercialization, inequality and ﬁnancial loss. Through various internal
restructurings, the NCAA has functioned essentially
as a trade association of ADs, coaches and conference
commissioners. Further, it has been consistently dominated by the power conferences within DIA or FBS.
The 2015 Convention decision to allow the Power
Five conferences to legislate autonomously on certain
economic matters underwrites this control, while it begins a more decisive bifurcation of the NCAA into two
distinct groups of colleges. As long as a smaller and
smaller group of athletically successful colleges increasingly dominate the NCAA, the Association is
even less able than it has been historically to implement meaningful reform.

TWO PATHS TO MEANINGFUL REFORM
Marketization
There are two possible paths to meaningful reform: (i)
toward marketization and professionalism or (ii) toward educationally centered athletics and amateurism.
The ﬁrst is embodied in Jeffrey Kessler’s antitrust suit,
ﬁled in the Third Circuit, on behalf of Martin Jenkins
against the NCAA. It claims that the NCAA functions
as a cartel that artiﬁcially and injuriously colludes to
preclude the development of a labor market for college
athletes and to prevent them from receiving fair compensation given their revenue contribution to the
school. If successful, Kessler’s suit would compel a
marketization of labor markets in intercollegiate athletics. While this suit has much economic logic to
commend it, it only makes sense in my judgment if
it is accompanied by a separation of big-time intercollegiate sports from the university. Such a schism, in
turn, would have serious consequences for the maintenance of college sports as we know them.
If an open labor market forms within college sports,
it will engender several intractable problems. First,
while acknowledging that today’s top college football
and men’s basketball teams do exploit their star
players (some have marginal revenue products of well
above $1 million,7 but they receive full scholarships
valued in the range of $30 000 to $70 000 annually),
introducing a labor market would be a complicated affair. For instance, the average FBS football team has
85 full scholarship players and 35 walk-on players.
The majority of the scholarship athletes probably
Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 634–643 (2017)
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produce a value well inferior to the value of their
scholarships. A few dozen produce a value close to
their scholarship value. The starters probably produce
a value from a little above to far in excess of their
scholarship value. (Of course, the scholarship value
itself only holds if the athletes are truly being educated and if they receive a degree—two conditions
that are not often met.) So, given this variation in
player value, how will labor market rules be constructed to fairly reward each player. Will the AD
negotiate individually with each player, with the result that each high school prospect ends up talking
to and bargaining with a dozen or more schools?
Will the prospective stars be allowed to have parents or lawyers or agents in the room to assist
them? Or will there be rules that constrain how the
negotiations unfold? And, if there are rules, what will
they be and who will set them?
Second, to the extent that such a labor market for
players does function, how will the resulting player incomes affect the student culture at the university? The
NCAA Constitution states clearly that the student–
athlete is to be integrated into the general student body.
Having players deriving incomes of hundreds of thousands of dollars or millions of dollars would even more
clearly create two classes of ‘students’ at the school.
And how would the introduction of market forces
impact college culture more generally? As a rule, once
a student is admitted and matriculated into the university, the market mechanism is not used to allocate resources among students. Students enroll in popular
classes according to their major, their class, their subject preparation or by random selection. Professors do
not use a market mechanism to determine who enters
the class. That is, professors do not hold an auction
to see which students are willing to offer the most
money to buy their way into the class.
Further, if we are to pay football and basketball
players, does that mean that, beyond minimal stipends,
we will also begin to pay thespians in school plays,
ﬁrst violinists in school orchestras or ballerinas in
school dance performances? In short, introducing a labor market for big-time sports is likely to be very disruptive on a variety of levels to the educational culture
and ﬁnances of U.S. colleges.
Third, as noted above, the median operating deficit of FBS athletic programs in fy 2014 was over
$14 million. The corresponding ﬁgure in the rest
of Division I was over $11 million.8 These numbers leave out large capital expenditures, so that
the actual deﬁcit or university subsidy can typically
surpass $20 million or $30 million annually—and it
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

has been growing over time. Hence, the question naturally emerges: if FBS programs are going to begin paying some athletes millions of dollars a year in salaries
(along with social security, unemployment, workmen’s
compensation and other beneﬁts) and others hundreds
of thousands of dollars, where is the money going to
come from? One partial source of funds is clear: today
college coaches are paid for the value of the athletes
they recruit. The top paid college coaches are compensated on a par with their counterparts in the NFL and
NBA, yet the their teams generally generate one-fourth
to one-tenth as much revenue. These discrepancies
would not make sense in a normal market; they only
make sense in college sports because compensation to
the players is artiﬁcially suppressed. So, if the athletes
were paid a salary, head and assistant coaches’ (and
ADs’) salaries would come down, but only after a transition period as current multiyear contracts play out. A
similar dynamic would obtain with stadiums, arenas,
ﬁtness facilities, tutoring buildings, etc. There would
be less need to invest in these auxiliary attractions,
because schools would be able to bid for athletes
directly with higher compensation. But here too, these
facilities have already been built and ﬁnanced with
long-term bonds. Money will not be freed up until these
bonds are paid off. The upshot is that some funds will
become available to help defray the higher costs of
athletes with an open labor market, but these funds will
only become available gradually over time. In the
protracted interim, there will a signiﬁcant new cost
burden that falls on athletic programs.
It seems probable that this marketization process
would ultimately result in the formation of a professional, minor league in both men’s basketball and
football. The competitive forces fostering the drive to
success will compel higher salaries, higher costs and
greater commercialization. Further, the continuation
of various tax preferences that currently go to college
sports (e.g. no payroll taxes for players, tax exempt
debt issuance for facility construction, favorable UBIT
interpretations, considering purchase of seats as ‘donations’ with 80% deductibility, inter alia) will come under greater scrutiny and heightened political pressure
for their elimination. Academic fraud will proliferate,
and schools will ﬁnd it in their increasing interest to
end the charade of amateur and educationally centered
college athletics.
Whether the emerging professional leagues, severed from their educational ties to the university, will
diminish the iconic branding associated with college
sports is another matter of concern. While the new minor league teams could continue to play at university
Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 634–643 (2017)
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facilities and attempt to elicit the interest of existing
fans and boosters, the leagues may devolve into little
more than minor league associations in the public’s
minds. While media pundits have argued stridently
on both sides of this branding issue, the reality is that
no one knows how the public will react.9
Perhaps even more troubling is that the ﬁnancial
support that the big-time football and men’s basketball
programs currently contribute to the Olympic sports
and to women’s sports will be gone. Olympic sports
in all three divisions will lose funding as will the implementation of Title IX. Thus, while there is a certain
logic to opening a labor market for college athletics,
there are many reasons to resist this development.
Reinforcement of Educationally
Centered Amateur Athletics
A major factor that facilitated, accelerated and
deepened the commercialization of college sports
was the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Oklahoma
v. NCAA. The majority of justices in that case
ruled that the commercial activities of the NCAA
were subject to antitrust law and that the NCAA’s
existing national television contract with ABC,
CBS and TBS was an illegal restraint of trade.
The ruling set the stage for subsequent conference
contracts with the television networks, a mergers
and acquisitions phase of conference growth which
redrew geographical conference lines to maximize
the value of media deals, and heightened incentives
to compromise academic integrity in pursuit of athletic glory.
One logical way to confront this tendency toward
the subordination of academics to athletics is to revisit
the major source of the post-1984 commercialization
juggernaut: the antitrust treatment of college sports.
By legislating a partial and conditional antitrust exemption for the governing body of college sports, it
would be possible not only to blunt the incentives that
are corroding academic integrity, but also to arrest the
runaway expenses that are burning a deep hole in the
pockets of athletic programs, and, therefore, also of
university budgets.
That is, on the condition that the governing body
enacts certain reforms to promote academic integrity
and the fair treatment of athletes, the governing body
would be granted an antitrust exemption in certain
commercial areas and in others that overlap between
commercial and academic areas. Because the Sherman
Act was designed to focus only on commercial decisions, it is very difﬁcult to apply it to activities that
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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are a hybrid with both commercial and noncommercial
effects as is the case with many NCAA policies. Most
of the former and current antitrust lawsuits ﬁled
against the NCAA fall in this hybrid, gray space—
where the key question is whether the rules such as
controlling compensation to athletes, compensation
to coaches, the value of athletic scholarships, etc.,
are necessary in order to protect the separation between college and professional sport. There are no
clear cut balancing tests or other mechanisms to make
these policy judgments cleanly. The answers end up
depending on the judgment of the particular court
and not on any clear objective standards.
This pattern is illustrated clearly in the September
2015 ruling of the Ninth Circuit of Appeals in
O’Bannon. The NCAA appealed the district court decision by Judge Wilken who had ruled that there were
two less restrictive ways that the NCAA could still
maintain amateurism and yet improve the compensation of athletes, to wit: ﬁrst, by allowing member
schools to offer scholarships that included a cost of attendance allowance, and, second, by allowing member
schools to offer a deferred payment to athletes of up to
$5000 annually for use of their names, images and
likenesses (NILs). Judge Jay Bybee, Judge Gordon
Quist and Chief Judge Sidney Thomas heard the
NCAA’s appeal and ruled that the NCAA did not have
to allow a deferred NIL payment to athletes because it
would amount to pay for a non-educational function
and would violate the norms of amateurism. To arrive
at this conclusion, Judge Bybee and Judge Quist
opined that consumers of college sports would lose interest in the product if athletes received NIL payments,
even on a deferred (payment not made until after they
left college) basis. Curiously, they made this judgment
without any solid empirical evidence whatsoever. Applying the same logic, the judges would have concluded that if college sports had been based on a
system of slavery and if the consumers found this appealing, that slavery would have been legal as far as
the antitrust laws are concerned. They compounded
their error by never engaging in a balancing test regarding the anti- and pro-competitive aspects of the
NCAA’s prohibition on NIL payments to athletes.10
A limited antitrust exemption in the hybrid space
between professionalism and amateurism would seek
to deﬁne clearly those actions of the NCAA which
could not be questioned under the Sherman Antitrust
Act on the grounds that they are controls necessary
to achieve the priority purposes of higher education
in the conduct of intercollegiate athletics as an extracurricular activity.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 38: 634–643 (2017)
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A fundamental function of the NCAA is to maintain a clear line of demarcation between college sports
as an extracurricular activity secondary to the academic responsibilities of students and professional
sports which require a time and effort priority on athletics excellence and revenue production inappropriate for a non-proﬁt educational institution. Actions
that should be considered the legitimate functions of
a non-proﬁt national intercollegiate athletics governance association typically include, among others,
those that (i) control the cost of athletics (athletic programs are heavily subsidized by student fees and general funds) so the support of athletics programs do not
damage the ability of the institution to support its primary academic programs, (ii) prevent the operation
of varsity sport programs from conﬂicting with student academic responsibilities (e.g. control of sport
schedules so they do not conﬂict with class attendance, restriction of athletic participation for students
not performing academically, limiting time spent on
sport activities in order to allow sufﬁcient time for
study, etc.) and (iii) protect the health and welfare
of college athletes (e.g. provision of insurance, protections related to return to play following injury).
Some of these actions also have commercial implications and will be the target of antitrust lawsuits. A
limited antitrust exemption that applies only to these
legitimate categories of controls will enable higher education institutions to collectively enact needed reforms without fear of legal liability and is both
justiﬁable and necessary. Such antitrust lawsuits represent huge costs for legal representation, participation
in court cases and payment of damages. These funds
would otherwise be available to advance the NCAA’s
and its member institutions’ non-proﬁt educational
purposes.
In what follows, I ﬁrst elaborate on what areas
might be granted an antitrust exemption and then on
the conditions the governing must follow to qualify
for the partial exemption.
Potentially Exempt Areas
First, the NCAA would be exempt from imposing
limits on the salaries paid to head football and men’s
basketball coaches, which often exceed the salaries of
the universities’ presidents by a factor of ﬁve to ten.11
Over one hundred and ten college football and basketball coaches received salaries exceeding $1 million in
2014; three dozen exceed $3 million, and ﬁfteen exceed
$4 million. The highest paid coach was Nick Saban at
Alabama with a salary of $7.2 million plus potential bonuses of $700 000. His contract is guaranteed with
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

increases through the 2021–2022 season. Saban’s staff
earned an additional $5.2 million in salary in 2014.
Thus, total football coaching compensation at Alabama
before handsome beneﬁts and rich perquisites exceeded
$13 million. Perquisites generally include free use of
cars, housing subsidies, country-club memberships,
private jet service, exceptionally generous severance packages and more.12 The coaches also have
handsome opportunities to earn outside income via
apparel or sneaker endorsements, the lecture circuit,
summer camps and book contracts. In 40 states the
head football or basketball on a college team makes
more than the governor.13
Back in 1924, Centenary College in Shreveport,
Louisiana, the nation’s ﬁrst liberal-arts college west
of the Mississippi, was denied accreditation by the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, because
the school placed an ‘undue emphasis on athletics.’ The
primary evidence of Centenary’s misplaced priorities by
the Southern Association was that the college paid its
football coach more than it paid its college president.
The next year the football coach was ﬁred, and the college gained accreditation.14
In more recent times, Bear Bryant, the legendary
head football coach at the University of Alabama
(1958–1982), adhered to a ﬁrm policy of always keeping his salary $1 below that of the school president.
Bryant believed that it was symbolically important
for the university president to be paid more than the
head football coach.15
Defenders of multimillion-dollar head coaches’
salaries are wont to repeat the mantra: ‘Coaches’
compensation packages are driven by market
forces.’ Fair enough, but what drives the market
forces? It is clear that the market for coaches is
sustained by several artiﬁcial factors: (i) no compensation is paid to the athletes, (ii) intercollegiate
sports beneﬁt from substantial tax privileges, (iii)
no shareholders demand dividend distributions or
higher proﬁts to bolster stock prices at the end of every
quarter, (iv) athletic departments’ are nourished by university and statewide ﬁnancial support, and (v) coaches’
salaries are negotiated by athletic directors whose own
worth rises with the salaries of their employees.
In a normal competitive market, college football
and basketball coaches would not be getting compensated almost at the same level as NFL and NBA
coaches. The top 32 college football programs generate revenues in the $35 million to $150 million range;
the revenue range for NFL teams is $296 million to
$620 million.16 The top 30 college men’s basketball
teams generate revenue roughly in the $10 million to
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$40 million range, while NBA team revenues go from
$110 million up to $293 million. Thus, NFL team revenues are 8.4 times college football teams revenues at
the lower end and 4.1 times at the top end; and, NBA
team revenues are 11 times those in college basketball
at the lower end and 7.3 times greater at the top end.
Yet the compensation packages of college and professional coaches in football and basketball are strikingly
similar.
What is wrong with this picture? Basically, it is that
the coaches are being paid the value created by the
players they recruit. Much recruiting is done by assistant coaches and much of the allure of the recruitment
effort has to with the school’s history and brand and its
facilities. Moreover, the coaches’ bloated compensation packages are almost all economic rent. That is,
they are being paid way beyond what they would have
to be paid to induce them to offer their labor in the college coaching market. If the Nick Sabans and John
Caliparis of the college coaching world did not coach
in an FBS program, their next best alternative employment opportunity likely would be coaching at FCS or
Division II or III, or high school. Thus, if the NCAA
placed, say, a $400 000 limit on coaches’ compensation packages, it would not affect the quality of
coaching or the level of intercollegiate competition
one iota. Stated differently, it would not affect the allocation of coaching resources or diminish the entertainment value of college sports. Further, it would
address the Bear Bryant concern of sending a twisted
signal to undergraduate students about the importance
of the college president or the professoriate relative to
the head football or basketball coach.
A second exempt policy would be the size of FBS
football teams. FBS football teams are allowed 85
scholarships. Sixty (or fewer) would do ﬁne.17 NFL
teams have a maximum active roster of 45, plus a
maximum inactive roster of eight additional players.18
The average FBS team has 35 walk-ons plus 85 scholarship players—a 120 players in all!19 If football
scholarships were cut to 60, the average college would
probably save close to $1.5 million annually20—easily
enough to ﬁnance an average FBS soccer team plus an
average FBS golf team, or an FBS tennis team plus
gymnastics team, and have several hundred thousand
dollars left over.21 Even assuming the number of
walk-ons would not increase with the lower scholarship limit, the average squad size would still be over
90. Is there a rational coach who would dare to argue
that 90-plus players on a football team are inadequate?
A third exempt policy would be restrictions on the
payment of salary to athletes for the performance in
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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their sport. Athletes could continue to receive full
scholarships for participating on their team, along with
a cost of living allowance and other elements to be
discussed shortly, but they could not be paid directly
for what they do on the football ﬁeld or basketball
court. This is basically the concept of amateurism
(i.e., no compensation for playing a sport) that is applied
by the AAU and other amateur sports organizations in
the United States.
Other areas of exemption that lean more toward the
academic integrity end of the spectrum include restrictions on weeknight football and basketball games, the
length of competitive seasons, the number of inseason and out-of-season practice and game hours
per week and academic eligibility standards, inter alia.
Conditions for Granting Partial Exemption
One can imagine a variety of conditionality stipulations geared toward insuring that athletes are treated
fairly and that academic fraud is, if not extirpated,
minimized. For the NCAA or an alternative governing
body to be granted a partial antitrust exemption, the
association would have to enact and implement certain
pro-educational reforms. A suggested, non-inclusive
list follows.
Initial eligibility standards need to be strengthened.
Since the 2003 sliding scale was introduced, it is possible for athletes to gain full initial eligibility and still
receive a zero score on standardized tests by raising
their grade point average to a 3.5.22 If, however, the
high school rigs the athlete’s classes and teachers to
achieve this GPA, then the initial eligibility standard
is a mockery. Similar issues apply to the continuing eligibility standards and to the APR metric. New, more
meaningful standards need to be set and become conditions for the antitrust exemption.
The governing body should also be required to put
in place appropriate due process procedures for all
schools, administrators and athletes who are accused
of transgressions prior to penalizing them.
Athletes rights must be fortiﬁed. Health and safety
protections as well as broader injury insurance coverage should be instituted. Allowable scholarships
should be expanded to include cost of attendance
and deferred publicity rights income, and athletes
should have the right to work with counsel or an
agent prior to deciding upon entering a professional
draft or participating in a sports league combine. All
academic support programs for athletes should be removed from the athletics department and put entirely
under academic control. Transfer athletes should not
lose a year of eligibility.
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The national championship football playoff system,
inaugurated in 2014–2015, generates more than $600
million in revenue, over three-fourths of which is distributed to the Power Five conferences. This skewed
distribution, at once, enhances the ﬁnancial incentives
toward victory at any cost and, importantly, diminishes funding for Olympic sports and women’s sports
throughout the NCAA’s three divisions. All national
championships except the FBS football playoff are
controlled by the NCAA. A condition for receiving a
partial antitrust exemption should be to bring the football playoff into the fold.
Other conditionality reforms might include
whistleblower protection, Title IX compliance and deﬁned controls over game scheduling.

CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that intercollegiate athletics
is at a tipping point. The status quo is not stable
and change is coming. This change can move college sports further toward commercialization and
quasi-professionalism or it can endeavor to reinforce the historical vision of college sports as an
amateur activity subordinated to the educational
mission of U.S. colleges. The former path will lead
to increasing academic scandals, widespread ﬁnancial insolvency and diminishing support for Olympic
sports and Title IX. The latter path, while not without
its own challenges, may succeed in restoring a proper
balance between athletics and academics.
Furthermore, this paper has suggested that a signiﬁcant role in restoring this balance can be played
by having Congress craft a constrained and conditional antitrust exemption for intercollegiate athletics. Without congressional action, the court system
will equivocate without producing clarity. In addition to uncertainty, the status quo will perpetuate
the exploitation of athletes and the undermining of
academic integrity. It will also waste hundreds of
millions of dollars on needless litigation. The plaintiff’s bill alone through the district court proceedings in O’Bannon was $46 million. The NCAA is
responsible for that sum as well as its own, and
much larger, legal expenses on the case. A congressionally conferred, conditional and constrained antitrust exemption will provide a clear, productive
way forward and in the process will, at once, blunt
incentives to academic fraud and fortify college
ﬁnances.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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2015, and will likely be $40 million in 2016.
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loans in an era of rising tuitions is daunting for prospective students and threatening to college admissions.
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has estimated that the MRP of star college athletes in
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If this were true, the top paid college athletes would receive an after-tax (federal income tax and ﬁca tax, but
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nytschoolsfortomorrow.com/gallery/schools-for-tomorrow-0/2015-videos.
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poorly designed survey by the NCAA and off-the-cuff remarks by Neal Pilson, and ignored some more robust historical evidence in the Olympics, Major League Baseball
and tennis, inter alia, should inspire little conﬁdence in their
judgment in the O’Bannon case. The ﬂimsy empirical and
dubious legal reasoning in its review of the district court’s
ruling in O’Bannon, however, promises to keep this matter
open for some time to come, especially if it is left to the
courts to decide.
10. The ruling further overlooked the fact that the AAU, the
USGA and other amateur sport organizations have considerably looser rules to deﬁne amateurism. These rules
essentially proscribe compensation for playing the
sport, not for activity such as endorsements off the
playing ﬁeld.
11. In a sample of forty-ﬁve Division I public universities,
Duke economist Charles Clotfelter found that between
1986 and 2007, the average compensation of full
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professors rose 30%, while that of university presidents
grew 100%, that of head basketball coaches jumped
400%, and that of head football coaches increased
500%. (Clotfelter, unpublished research. Clotfelter had
full data on basketball salaries for twenty-two schools
and on football salaries for forty-ﬁve.)
One eye-popping severance clause appeared in the contract of Mike Sherman, Texas A&M’s football coach,
who, if terminated, would have been paid $150,000 a
month for the remainder of his contract that would have
amounted to a $7.8 million golden handshake.
In a 41st state, New Hampshire, the head ice hockey
coach earns more than the governor.
James Johnson, “The suicide season,” Shreveport
Times, September 4, 2008.
Allen Barra, The Last Coach: A Life of Paul “Bear”
Bryant (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).
The revenue estimates for NBA and NFL teams come
from the 2015 Forbes annual reports. Those for college
football and basketball teams come from the 2015
NCAA Revenues and Expenses bi-annual report.
College coaches have protested that college football
teams cannot be properly compared to professional
teams. The latter, they say, can always call up reserves
when players get injured, but college teams must have
players on their rosters to replace the injured. First,
NFL teams have a maximum of sixteen players on reserve and practice squads to complement their fortyﬁve-men active rosters. Second, the NCAA Injury
Surveillance System Summary reports that for the
2000–2001 season, the serious-injury rate during
games in football was 14.1 per 1,000 exposures, while

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

643

the rate in football practices was 1.6 per 1,000. If we
assume that sixty players enter a game and the team
plays thirteen games during the year (that is, including
a postseason game), then the average total number of
serious injuries (where a player is out seven or more
days) from games is eleven per year. If on average
each such player misses two games, then the average
number of game-injured players is 1.69 per game.
Performing a similar calculation for practice-injured
players yields 1.48 per game for a combined average
of 3.17 injured players per game. This hardly constitutes a justiﬁcation for carrying 85 scholarship and
117 total players on an FBS team.
Teams are also allowed to carry up to eight additional
players on their practice squads.
NCAA, Gender Equity Report, 2005–06, October 2008,
p. 27.
This number is based on twenty-ﬁve men’s scholarships
at $40,000 each, plus the possibility of savings on
women’s scholarships and the probable reduction in
athletic support staff and equipment.
NCAA, NCAA Revenues and Expenses: Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report, 2004–08, October 2009, p. 37.
While this sliding scale eligibility was introduced after a two-decade struggle with the Black Coaches
Association that claimed a hard cutoff on standardized tests was arbitrary and discriminatory toward
minority athletes. It is interesting to note the growth
in the participation of African-American athletes in
college sports actually was more rapid prior to
2003 than it was after.
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